Counterfactuals and Mediation

Brady Neal

causalcourse.com

Counterfactuals Basics


Important Application: Mediation

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Counterfactuals Basics

Important Application: Mediation

Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference



T: observed treatment


: observed outcome

i : used in subscript to denote a

specific unit/individual

 $Y_i(1)$: potential outcome under treatment

 $Y_i(0)$: potential outcome under no treatment




Causal effect

$$Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) = 1$$

Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference

Counterfactual



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
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
Factual



Causal effect

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Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference



T: observed treatment

Y: observed outcome


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Counterfactual



Causal effect

$$Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) = 1$$

We can compute counterfactuals using a parametric SCM.

Counterfactual: $P(Y(t) \mid T = t', Y = y')$

observation Counterfactual: $P(Y(t) \mid T = t', Y = y')$

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hypothetical condition

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Counterfactual:
$$P(Y(t) \mid T = t', Y = y')$$

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Different from CATE: $\mathbb{E}[Y(t) \mid X = x] = \mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(t), X = x]$

Cannot express counterfactuals using do-notation

Given: Observation of (T, Y) (observation of potential outcome Y(t) where t is the observed value of T)

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Main ingredient necessary: correct parametric model for the structural equation for Y

Result: access to counterfactuals Y(t') at the unit-level

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Observation: T = 0 and Y = 0

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Step 1: Solve for U

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Computing Counterfactuals: Simple Example

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ITE:
$$Y_u(1) - Y_u(0) = 1 - 0 = 1$$

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- 3. Prediction: Use the value of U from step 1 and the modified SCM from step 2 to compute the value of Y(t)

Question:

Given the observation T = 1 and Y = 0, compute Y(0) for this individual given the following SCM:

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Even when we have the structural equation for Y, we can't always determine counterfactuals with probability 1

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Example:

$$Y := egin{cases} 1 & U = ext{always happy} \\ 0 & U = ext{never happy} \\ T & U = ext{dog-needer} \\ 1 - T & U = ext{dog-hater} \end{cases}$$

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$$P(U = \text{always happy}) = 0.3$$

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Observation: T = 1 and Y = 0
$$(Y_u(1) = 0) \qquad P(U = \text{never happy} \mid T = 1, Y = 0) = \frac{0.2}{0.2 + 0.1} = \frac{2}{3}$$
$$P(U = \text{dog-hater} \mid T = 1, Y = 0) = \frac{0.1}{0.2 + 0.1} = \frac{1}{3}$$
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Main ingredient necessary for computing counterfactuals: parametric model for the structural equation for Y

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Strong assumption

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Main ingredient necessary for computing counterfactuals: parametric model for the structural equation for Y

Strong assumption

Without it, we are stuck with the fundamental problem of causal inference.

Question:

Given the observation T = 1 and Y = 1, compute Y(0) for this individual given the following SCM and prior:

$$Y := \begin{cases} 1 & U = \text{always happy} \\ 0 & U = \text{never happy} \\ T & U = \text{dog-needer} \\ 1 - T & U = \text{dog-hater} \end{cases} \qquad P(U = \text{always happy}) = 0.3$$

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Population-level counterfactual: $\mathbb{E}[Y(t) \mid T = t']$

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Just like we were able to identify the ATE $\mathbb{E}[Y(1) - Y(0)]$ nonparametrically (using just the causal graph), we can do the same with population-level counterfactual quantities, if they are identifiable

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
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See <u>Malinsky et al.</u> (2019)'s potential outcome calculus (generalization of do-calculus) for general identification of counterfactual quantities


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Important Application: Mediation

Mediation





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



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
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


















$$\mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T=1), M=m] - \mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T=0), M=m]$$



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


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
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
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Problems:

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


Problems:

• CDE is specific to the arbitrary choice of m

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Problems:

- CDE is specific to the arbitrary choice of m
- How do we get the indirect effect? Can't just subtract the CDE from the total effect

$$\mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T = 1, M = m)] - \mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T = 0, M = m)]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T=1), M=m] - \mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T=0), M=m]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{t,m}] \triangleq \mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T = t, M = m)]$$

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Subscript notation:

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Recall problems with CDE:

- CDE is specific to the arbitrary choice of m
- How do we get the indirect effect? Can't just subtract the CDE from the total effect

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For example in linear setting, TE = NDE + NIE

Question: Show that $\text{TE} = \text{NDE} - \text{NIE}_r$, where $\text{NIE}_r \triangleq \mathbb{E}[Y_{1,M_0} - Y_{1,M_1}]$.

Comparison of Controlled vs. Natural Mediation

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NDE cannot always be measured via experiments since it is counterfactual, but it allows for the complete decomposition of the total effect into the NDE and NIE, which is what we'd like in mediation analysis

Adjustment set W

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Sufficient conditions for identifying NDE:

1. No member of W is a descendant of T

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NDE =
$$\sum_{m} \sum_{w} (\mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T = 1, M = m), W = w] - \mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T = 0, M = m), W = w])$$

 $\times P(M = m \mid do(T = 0), W = w)P(W = w)$

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4.

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$$\begin{aligned} \text{NDE} &= \sum_{m} \sum_{w} \left(\mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T = 1, M = m), W = w] - \mathbb{E}[Y \mid do(T = 0, M = m), W = w] \right) \\ &\times P(M = m \mid do(T = 0), W = w) P(W = w) \\ &= \sum_{m} \sum_{w} \left(\mathbb{E}[Y \mid T = 1, M = m, W = w] - \mathbb{E}[Y \mid T = 0, M = m, W = w] \right) \\ &\times P(M = m \mid T = 0, W = w) P(W = w) \end{aligned}$$

Adjustment set W

$$TE = NDE - NIE_r$$

- 1. No member of W is a descendant of T
- 2. W blocks all backdoor paths from M to Y
- 3. $P(M = m \mid do(T = 0), W = is)$ identifiable (e.g. no unblockable backdoor paths from T to M)
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Question:

Come up with your own example of mediation and the corresponding graph. Then, determine whether you can identify the NDE and NIE from observational data.

Path-Specific Effects

Measure causal effects along arbitrary path or set of paths in the causal graph

See "Identifiability of Path-Specific Effects" (Avin et al., 2005)